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Abstract: The Internet can be seen as the convergence of diﬀerent industries,
such as telecommunication, software and media, into an international oligopoly of-
fering complementary products. In most of these industries we have dominant firms,
but domestic telecommunication firms providing local access are the only ones facing
a restrictive regulatory regime. The other dominant firms are typically US owned.
We show that strict regulation of the domestic telecommunication firm may have
negative welfare eﬀects for other countries than the USA, particularly if we observe
fierce competition in the end-user market.
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1 Introduction
In order to get tied up to the global Internet the end-users must be connected to
the local telephone network through an Internet Service Provider (ISP). The ISP in
turn provides access to diﬀerent contents and applications on the Internet through
regional and global backbone providers. The Internet is thus often described as the
joint supply of several complementary inputs. This is illustrated by Figure 1, where
we portray the Internet as a layered network structure with the physical network as
one layer, and applications, contents and the service network as other layers. The
purpose of this article is to investigate how the complementary within and between
the diﬀerent layers aﬀects the optimal public policy towards the dominant domestic
provider of local access.
Content (People-to-people communication, e-commerce,…
Applications (Voice, video…
Service Network (Routing protocols, packet structure…)
Physical network (Local access, regional and global backbones,…)
Figure 1: The layered Internet structure
We observe dominant firms in several of the complementary product groups.
Apparently, the domestic telecommunication firm still has a dominant position in the
local network in many countries.2 In the global backbone network the five firms MCI
2For example, telecommunication incumbents have an installed base of telephone lines that
reach almost all households. For residential consumers the main alternative to telephone lines
for local access to the Internet is cable-TV-networks, which in Europe are often controlled by
the telecommunication incumbents. Since upgrading of the existing telephone lines and cable-
TV-lines are the two main alternatives for broadband Internet access, it seems obvious that the
telecommunication incumbents will have market power in the segment for local access in Europe
also in the future. The diﬀerences between the US and Europe regarding alternatives for broadband
access are described by Roche et al. (2001).
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WorldCom, Genuity (formerly GTE), Sprint, AT&T and Cable &Wireless dominate
the provision of core Internet backbone service, of which all except the last one are
US owned firms.3 US firms such as Microsoft and Cisco have dominant positions in
provision of personal computer operating systems and routers, respectively, while
AOL Time Warner seems to gradually achieve a more dominant position in providing
content to regional ISPs.4
The downstream market for ISPs is generally believed to be more competitive
than many other market segments in the telecommunication industry, and is un-
regulated both in the USA and in Europe (see Cave and Mason, 2001). Domestic
telecommunication firms, on the other hand, have historically faced a rather restric-
tive regulatory regime both on price and quality. A few firms - for example Microsoft
and MCI WorldCom - have been challenged by anti-trust authorities, but by and
large foreign input suppliers have not been regulated at all.5
We thus see that the Internet is a mixture of diﬀerent complementary products,
provided by domestic and foreign firms with market power, where some firms face
a restrictive regulatory regime and others are unregulated. In such a setting, what
would be the optimal regulation of domestic firms? In order to focus on this question
we develop a simple model where we make four basic assumptions.
First, we assume that two ISPs compete a´-la Bertrand with diﬀerentiated prod-
ucts in the retail market. An assumption of product diﬀerentiation seems quite
natural, since we to an increasingly larger degree observe that ISPs bundle Inter-
net access with - for example - content from one particular content provider. For
high-speed Internet access (broadband) it is likely that some ISPs will oﬀer premium
3See Besen et al. (2001), Milgrom et al. (2000), Cre´mer, Rey and Tirole (2000), Dogan (2000),
Kende (2000), Laﬀont, Marcus, Rey and Tirole (2001a, 2001b) for more details concerning the role
of the Internet backbone providers.
4In 2000 Cisco’s market share of the total router market was 84 percent (Cave and Mason,
2001), while Microsoft’s market share in the market for personal computer operating systems the
last year was approximately 90 percent (see e.g. Gilbert and Katz, 2001).
5Laﬀont and Tirole (2000) and Armstrong (2001) give detailed overviews of the theory of access
pricing and discussions of the regulation paradigm of the domestic access provider. Cave andMason
(2001) give an extensive overview of the market structure and the regulation policy in diﬀerent
segments of the Internet.
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connectivity and content only to their own customers (see Shapiro and Varian (1998)
and Cre´mer et al. (2000)). This is often called ”a walled garden strategy”, and will
obviously create product diﬀerentiation.
Second, we assume that two upstream firms provide complementary inputs to
the two downstream firms. The upstream firms can be interpreted as one domestic
provider of local access and one foreign input provider. The foreign input provider
may be a global backbone provider (such as MCI WorldCom) or a content provider
(such as AOL Time Warner).
Third, we assume vertical separation between the upstream and the downstream
firms. In several countries the local access provider is vertically integrated into
the retail market, and we also see that firms like MCI WorldCom and AOL Time
Warner are active also in the retail markets outside the USA. On the other hand,
we do observe that many retailers are independent downstream firms. In such a
setting it is more natural to focus on vertical separation than vertical integration.
However, it can be shown that our main results are valid also in a setting with
vertical integration.6
Fourth, we assume that the domestic regulator is able to impose a price cap on
the domestic upstream firms (the local access provider). Throughout, we presuppose
that the retail ISP-segment and the foreign upstream provider are unregulated. As
mentioned above, this corresponds to the existing regulation regime.7
In our model we find that the optimal regulatory policy depends crucially on
the ability of the regulator and the foreign firm to commit themselves in their price
setting. If there is no price commitment at all, neither by the regulator nor by the
foreign firm, the best regulatory policy is not to regulate. The reason is that a price
cap allows the foreign input provider to set a higher price, resulting in an excessive
profit shifting out of the country.
6This is shown in Foros, Kind and Sørgard (2001), where vertical separation is compared with
partial vertical integration (some firms vertical integrated) and with complete vertical integration
(all firms vertical integrated). See also Foros, Kind and Sørgard (2002), where vertical integration
is analyzed in a setting with homogenous products and Cournot competition.
7Laﬀont and Tirole (2000, p. 182-183) discuss the assumption of no retail price regulation in
telecommunication.
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However, it may be beneficial for the regulator to impose a price cap if the foreign
firm is able to commit itself. In such a case - which we denote ex post regulation -
the foreign firm will be a first-mover and set a relatively low input price. Thereby
the regulator is encouraged to set a restrictive price cap on local access, and the
price cap will be more restrictive the more diﬀerentiated the downstream goods. If
the goods are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated, and the regulator is allowed to set a price
below long run marginal costs, this policy is welfare improving. The reason for this
is that the price distortion in the end user market is then so large that the country
gains from a restrictive price cap, despite the fact that such a policy will shift profits
out of the country.
Suppose instead that the regulator is best able to commit itself, which means
that it has a first-mover advantage over the foreign firm. In this case - denoted ex
ante regulation - a binding price cap will always improve domestic welfare (except
in the case where the products are perfect substitutes in the end user market). The
regulator sets a binding price cap to pass on to final consumers a price reduction
that partly oﬀsets the price distortion in the end user market. But it decides to set
a price that exceeds long run marginal costs. Thereby the foreign firm will set a
relatively low price on its upstream good, and this reduces the profit shift out of the
country.
The paper relates to the literature on strategic trade policy, which is also con-
cerned about international profit shifting.8 Note, though, that there are some impor-
tant distinctions between our study and that strand of the literature. In particular,
we focus on the eﬀects of a price cap rather than on the eﬀects of subsidies and
tariﬀs. Moreover, we model a setting with complementary inputs produced by one
foreign and one domestic firm, respectively. In contrast, strategic trade policy is
typically focusing on downstream competition between domestic and foreign firms
producing substitutes, and abstract from possible complementarities.9
8For overviews of the literature on strategic trade policy, see for example Krugman (1989) and
Brander (1995).
9In his review of the literature, Brander (1995) focused on two modelling approaches: the third-
market model, and the reciprocal-markets model. In both models the assumption was that firms
produce substitutes.
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The article is organized as follows. In the next section we present the model
where we compare the market equilibrium with three diﬀerent regulatory regimes.
In Section 3 we oﬀer some concluding remarks.
2 The model
There is one foreign firm, F , and one domestic firm, N , controlling each their es-
sential input. These inputs are supplied to two downstream firms, X1 and X2, that
sell diﬀerentiated consumer goods at prices p1 and p2, respectively, in a domestic
market.10 The market structure is shown in Figure 2. We assume that X1 and
X2 are independent domestic firms, and that they are charged n per unit of the
input provided by firm N and f per unit of the input from firm F . Throughout the
paper we assume that the only instrument available for the regulator is to regulate
the price of local access n. The other input price f and the retail prices p1 and p2
are unregulated.
F
N
X1
ff
n n
X2
Figure 2: Market structure
The utility function of the consumers is equal to
U = x1 + x2 − x
2
1
2
− x
2
2
2
− bx1x2, where 0 < b < 1. (1)
10Foros and Hansen (2001), Dogan (2000), and Mason (1999) assume that ISPs oﬀer horizontally
diﬀerentiated services and compete a´-la Hotelling. Their focus is on interconnection quality rather
than on access prices.
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The parameter b determines the degree of product diﬀerentiation. When b is close to
1 the products are (almost) perfect substitutes, while they are (almost) independent
products when b is close to 0.
Let pi be the price of good xi, where i = 1, 2. Since we know that marginal
utility is equal to price, we have
pi = 1− xi − bxj , i = 1, 2 (i 6= j). (2)
Then we have the following demand system for the downstream firms:
xi =
1− b− pi + bpj
1− b2 . (3)
Using equations (1) and (2) we can now express consumer surplus, CS = U −
p1x1 − p2x2, as
CS =
1
2
x21 +
1
2
x22 + bx1x2. (4)
In order to produce the final goods the downstream firms need one unit of a
service that is supplied by a domestic monopolist N and one unit of a service that is
supplied by a foreign monopolist F. The profit levels of the downstream firms may
thus be written as
πi = (pi − n− f)xi. (5)
The marginal costs of the domestic and foreign bottleneck inputs are normalized
to zero, which means that the profit levels of these firms are equal to
πN = n(x1 + x2) (6)
and
πF = f(x1 + x2). (7)
Firm N and the two downstream firms are owned by the domestic consumers,
and the welfare is given by
W = CS + πD, (8)
where πD = πN + π1 + π2.
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In the final stage of the game the two downstream firms compete a´-la Bertrand.
Inserting for (2) into (5) we find that ∂πi/∂pi = 0 implies
pi(pj) =
1− (1− pj)b+ n+ f
2
. (9)
Since the downstream firms are symmetric we may omit subscripts, and express
equilibrium prices and quantities as
p =
1− b+ n+ f
2− b (10)
and
x =
1− n− f
(1+ b) (2− b) . (11)
It is easily seen from equation (10) that the equilibrium end user prices approach
monopoly prices as b approaches 0, and the perfectly competitive prices as b ap-
proaches 1.
2.1 Market equilibrium
In the first stage firms N and F simultaneously set n and f , respectively. Solving
∂πN/∂n = 0 = ∂πF/∂f we find that
n = 1/2− f/2 ≡ n∗(f) (12)
and
f = 1/2− n/2 ≡ f ∗(n). (13)
These are the upstream firms’ reaction functions, and in Figure 3 we have drawn
the reaction curves. They have negative slopes, as is what we should expect in a
setting with complementary products and price setting.11
11As shown in Bulow et al. (1985), with price setting and complementary products the choice
variables are typically strategic substitutes. Then each reaction curve has a negative slope, as is
the case in our setting.
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Figure 3: Reaction curves if no regulation
By combining equations (12) and (13) we find that
n = f = 1/3, (14)
which are denoted by n∗ and f ∗ in Figure 3. Inserting for n and f into (8) and (10)
we further have
p =
5− 3b
3(2− b) (15)
and
W ∗ =
7− 4b
9 (b+ 1) (2− b)2 . (16)
2.2 Price regulation of the domestic upstream good
Let us now introduce regulation. Both in the EU and the US we observe that
domestic providers of local access are facing a restrictive price cap on local access.
In line with this, we shall assume that the domestic regulator can impose a price
cap on the local access price. In principle it is possible that the government can
commit itself to a certain price cap before the foreign firm sets its price. However,
it is also possible that the government acts according to a per se rule. If so, it
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may either be the case that the foreign firm is better able to commit itself than the
regulator, or that neither of them are able to commit themselves.12 In line with this
we find it natural to consider three diﬀerent timings in this section. First we assume
that the foreign firm has a first-mover advantage, then that the foreign firm and the
regulator set their prices f and n simultaneously, and finally that the regulator has
a first-mover advantage.
2.2.1 Ex post regulation
Suppose that the foreign firm is able to commit itself to a certain price f before the
regulator chooses n. The regulator sets n such that domestic welfare is maximized.
The best the regulator can do is then to set the price n such that the end-user price
is equal to domestic marginal costs; p = f .13 This means that n should be chosen
according to p = (1− b+ n+ f) / (2− b) = f, or
n = −(1− b)(1− f) ≡ no(f). (17)
This equation - which we denote the regulator’s reaction function - reflects the fact
that the price of the national input should be set lower the less competitive the
downstream market. The optimal value of n is thus strictly increasing in b; it equals
−(1−f) if the goods are independent, and zero if the goods are homogenous (because
there is perfect downstream competition in the latter case).
Note also that n0(f) > 0 for b < 1.The reason for this is that as long as the firms
face downward-sloping demand curves it is inoptimal for the downstream firms to
pass over an increase in f one-for-one to the consumers. Some of the cost increase
will be covered by the firms, and therefore an increase in f requires a higher n in
order to maintain marginal cost pricing. This results in a reaction curve with a
positive slope for the regulator, as illustrated in Figure 4. Note that the regulator’s
reaction curve is qualitatively diﬀerent from the domestic firm’s reaction curve (see
Figure 3).
12This is in line with what is claimed by Brander (1995, p. 1403): ”Most observers find it
plausible that governments often have some sort of commitment advantage, but it is important to
be alert for circumstances in which the asymmetry may run in the other direction”.
13This can easily be verified by maximization of the welfare function.
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Figure 4: Reaction curves with regulation of the domestic access price
The maximization problem of the foreign firm is to solve ∂πF/∂f = 0 subject to
(17). Technically speaking, the foreign firm acts as a Stackelberg leader and chooses
the point on the regulator’s reaction curve that maximizes its own profit (see Figure
4). The solution to this problem is to set
f = 1/2. (18)
Inserting for f into (17) we further have
n = − (1− b) /2. (19)
Since end user prices are equal to domestic marginal costs, it follows that p = f =
1/2.
It is easily verified that end-user prices with regulation are lower than without
regulation for all b < 1 . However, the price of the foreign input is higher in the
regulatory regime (c.f. equations (14) and (18)). The foreign firm exploits the fact
that the regulator will set a low price on the domestic input by increasing its own
price. Regulation therefore leads to a higher profit flow from the domestic country
to the foreign country, while the profit level falls to zero for the domestic firms.
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Inserting for n and f we find that welfare is now equal to:
WSO = CS =
1
4 (1+ b)
. (20)
Comparing equations (16) and (20) we find that a necessary and suﬃcient con-
dition for ex post regulation to improve welfare is that b < 2
9
(5 − √7). Regulation
is therefore beneficial if and only if the goods are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated. This is
illustrated by Figure 5, which shows the diﬀerenceW SO−W ∗ as a function of b. The
intuition for the shape of this curve is that the downstream firms set a high mark-up
when the goods are highly diﬀerentiated, in which case the social planner is able to
improve welfare by setting a low value for n (high subsidy). If the goods are close
substitutes, on the other hand, the high competitive pressure in the downstream
market reduces the need for a subsidy. The net eﬀect of a price cap is then to shift
profit to the foreign firm.
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
b
WSO – W*
Figure 5: WSO −W ∗. Ex post regulation
The main insight from the above result is that ex post regulation cannot improve
domestic welfare if there is imperfect competition only in the upstream market;
there must also be significant market imperfections in the downstream market. In
the latter case the gain from reducing the high mark-up in the downstream market
outweighs the profit loss out of the country.
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However, a regulation regime as described above, where the input from the do-
mestic upstream firm is sold at a price below long-run marginal costs, is rarely
observed. The most common regulation regime is instead to allow regulated firms
to charge a price which covers their long-run marginal costs, but not to require that
they sell at a price lower than this. In the present context this means that the
regulator must set a price n ≥ 0 (while we still have f = 1/2). The best ex post reg-
ulation is therefore obviously to set n = 0. However, this means that the regulator is
less able to counterbalance the lack of competition in the downstream market with
a low price on the input from the domestic bottleneck owner. In the appendix we
therefore show that welfare is always lower with regulation than without regulation
if we impose the restriction n ≥ 0, and that it is equal to
W SO =
1
4
3− 2b
(2− b)2 (1+ b) . (21)
To sum up, we have the following welfare eﬀects of ex post regulation:
Proposition 1: Ex post regulation of the price of the domestic upstream good is
welfare improving if and only if the downstream goods are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated
and the regulated domestic input price is set below long-run marginal costs.
2.2.2 The regulator and the foreign firm set prices simultaneously
Suppose that neither the foreign firm nor the regulator can credibly commit them-
selves with respect to the prices of the upstream goods. This we may model as if f
and n are set simultaneously. The foreign firm and the regulator’s reaction functions
are as before, c.f. equations (13) and (17). From this we find that
f =
b− 2
b− 3 (22)
and
n = −1− b
3− b. (23)
Recall that the foreign firm committed itself to set f = 1/2 under a regime with
ex post regulation. Given that n < 0, though, the reaction function f(n) tells us
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that the firm would have preferred f > 1/2. This can also be seen from Figure
4, where the ex post regulation solution is not on the foreign firm’s own reaction
curve. However, the foreign firm is aware of the fact that in the ex post regulation
regime a higher f would have led to an increase in n in the next stage (because
n0(f) > 0). When F is not able to commit itself, as is now the case, the foreign
firm cannot induce a strict price cap by setting a low value of f. The foreign firm
therefore sets a higher price. It thus follows that both f and n increase relative
to the regime with ex post regulation (this is easily seen by comparing equations
(18)-(19) and (22)-(23)). Evidently, this is detrimental to the profit level of F. It is
also detrimental to domestic welfare. The latter is true because the higher value of
f means that end user prices increase (p = f), while aggregate domestic industry
profit is in any case equal to zero. In the appendix we further show that we now
have
W SO = CS =
1
(1+ b) (3− b)2 , (24)
and that this welfare level is lower than the welfare level in the market equilibrium
for all values of b.
If we impose the restriction that the regulator cannot choose any n < 0, we have
the same results as with ex post regulation and n ≥ 0. The welfare level in this case
is already shown to be lower than in the market equilibrium. We thus have:
Proposition 2: Let us suppose that the foreign firm and the regulator set the
prices of the upstream goods simultaneously. Welfare is then lower than in the market
equilibrium.
By comparing Propositions 1 and 2, we see that regulation improves domestic
welfare only if the foreign firm is able to commit itself with respect to the price that
it charges. The reason is that the foreign firm will use a first-mover advantage to set
a relatively low input price (in order to encourage the regulator to set a low input
price as well). This implies that the profit loss out of the country is more limited,
and the end-users gain from lower prices.
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2.2.3 Ex ante regulation
Suppose next that the regulator is able to commit itself with respect to the local
access price. In this case it is optimal for the regulator to use a less strict regulation
of n than in the previous cases we have considered. The reason is that an increase in
the price of the domestic upstream good will reduce the price of the foreign upstream
good. Formally, the regulator solves
WSO = max
n
(CS + πD)
s.t. f(n) =
1
2
(1− n).
Technically speaking, the regulator chooses the point on the foreign firm’s reaction
curve that maximizes domestic welfare (see Figure 4). Since the downstream firms
are symmetric (x1 = x2), we have
dCS
dn
= 2x(1+ b)
dx
dn
(25)
and
dπD
dn
= 2 [1− 2x(1+ b)] dx
dn
− 2
"
f
dx
dn
+ x
df
dn
#
, (26)
where
dx
dn
=
∂x
∂f
df
dn
+
∂x
∂n
. (27)
An increase in n reduces the output from the downstream firms, and the re-
sulting loss of domestic revenues from each downstream good is shown by the
first square bracket in (26). Diﬀerentiating equation (11) we find that ∂x/∂n =
−1/ [(1+ b)(2− b)] , while from the reaction function of Firm F we have that df/dn =
−1/2. Since ∂x/∂f = ∂x/∂n we thus see that the total change in x is equal to
dx/dn = −1/ [2(1+ b)(2− b)] = (1/2)∂x/∂n. The negative quantity eﬀect of in-
creasing n is thus only half as large with ex ante regulation as when the regulator
cannot commit itself (in which case ∂f/∂n = 0).
An increase in n also reduces demand and the equilibrium price of the foreign
downstream good. The second square bracket in (26) thus shows the size of the
domestic cost saving for each downstream good.
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Setting dW SO/dn = 0, and inserting for f, dx/dn and ∂f/∂n we find that
WS0 =
1
(1+ b) (5− 2b) , (28)
and that the prices of the upstream goods are given by
n =
1
5− 2b (29)
and
f =
2− b
5− 2b. (30)
Note that n is now positive, but lower than the price that the domestic upstream
monopolist would prefer as long as b < 1. Therefore f is also in this case higher in
the regulated economy than in the market equilibrium. This is illustrated in Figure
4. However, welfare is higher (c.f. equations (16) and (28)). We thus have
Proposition 3: If b = 1, the optimal ex ante regulation of the domestic upstream
good is no regulation. If b < 1, the regulator sets n such that n∗ > n > 0, which
results in f > f ∗ and improved domestic welfare.
If the downstream goods are diﬀerentiated it is thus welfare enhancing for the
regulator to partly correct the distortion in the downstream market by setting a price
cap on the domestic access price. Note, however, that this is not a very restrictive
regulatory regime. The regulator will always set a price that exceeds marginal costs.
If it had set a more restrictive price cap, the profit shift to the foreign country would
have outweighed the gain for domestic consumers from lower prices.
Finally, note that
Corollary 1: Independent of the timing of the game, the regulated price of the
domestic upstream good is increasing in b.
The intuition for this corollary is simply that a high value for b means that the
downstream market is relatively competitive, making it less imperative with a low
value on n.
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Using Figure 4, we can compare the input prices in the diﬀerent regulatory
regimes. We see that in all the three regulatory regimes the foreign firm sets a
higher prices than in the regime with no regulation. This illustrates that the foreign
firm exploits the fact that regulation in all three cases leads to a binding price cap
on the domestic upstream good.
3 Concluding remarks
The Internet can be seen as the convergence of diﬀerent industries like telecommu-
nication, software, and media into an international oligopoly, where the end-user is
oﬀered a bundle consisting of complementary products such as access to local and
global networks, software, and content. In several of the industries we observe dom-
inant firms. Except for local access, where the domestic telecommunication firm is
the dominant firm, these dominant firms are typically large US owned firms. Last,
but not least, there is a striking asymmetry concerning regulatory policy. While
domestic providers of local access have faced a restrictive regulatory regime, few
other dominant firms in the Internet industry have been regulated. This raises the
question: Will a restrictive regulation of local access still make sense? We find that
in some cases no regulation is the optimal regulation, but that the optimal policy
depends crucially on characteristics of the industry, such as the degree of product
diﬀerentiation, and the parties’ ability to commit themselves.
We conjecture that the problem on which we have focused will become even
more important in the future. When the Internet was established, the payment for
using the Internet was typically made to gain access to the local telecommunication
provider. A few years ago the Internet backbone providers started to charge ISPs
for access to the global network, which is needed for complete access to the Internet.
Content providers are gradually becoming more concerned about the low revenues
that they receive for their services.14 The providers of products that are comple-
14In Kahin and Varian (2000) there are numerous examples of business models for content
providers on the Internet. For example, Mings and White (2000) discuss how news agencies can
earn profits from online news.
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mentary to local access are demanding a share of the revenues generated on the
Internet.15 This is exactly the setting we are analyzing, where a domestic regulator
of domestic access must take into account the fact that regulation can shift profits
from the domestic access provider to other providers of complementary products,
often large, foreign firms.
If foreign providers of inputs that are complementary to local access do not have
market power, there is no reason for the domestic regulator to take profit shifting
into account. This illustrates that international cooperation on antitrust policy
that curbs market power for large, international firms might in theory be a better
solution than a more liberal domestic regulatory policy. However, it remains to be
seen whether international cooperation on antitrust policy is a realistic solution,
since the host country of the dominant firms typically will have conflicting interests
to those of other countries.
15In both Sweden and Norway content providers are organized in alliances, and they argue
that they should have a larger share of the revenue generated on the Internet. In Sweden they
have threatened to introduce a filter that can monitor the Internet traﬃc. If an Internet surfer is
connected through an ISP that has no agreement with the content provider, he or she will be denied
access to the content provider. (see http://rigg.aftenposten.no/nyheter/okonomi/d221464.htm).
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5 Appendix
Proof of equation (21)
With ex post regulation and the restriction n ≥ 0 we find that p = (3− 2b) / [2(2− b)]
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and x = 1/ [2(1+ b)(2− b)] . We thus have
π1 = π2 =
1
4
1− b
(2− b)2 (1+ b) and
CS =
1
4 (2− b)2 (1+ b) .
Using that πN = 0, and inserting for π1, π2 and CS,we find (21). The diﬀerence
between welfare in the regulated and the unregulated economy (equations (21) and
(16)) is then equal to
W SO −W ∗ = − 1
36
1+ 2b
(2− b)2 (1+ b) < 0.
Proof of equation (24)
When the foreign firm and the regulator set the prices f and n simultaneously,
we find that x = 1/ [(1+ b) (3− b)] . Inserting for this into equation (4) we find
equation (21). The diﬀerence between welfare in the regulated and the unregulated
economy (equations (21) and (16)) is then equal to
WSO −W ∗ = −1
9
(3− 2b) (9 + 2b(b− 4)
(1+ b) (3− b)2 (2− b)2 < 0.
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